Platts - Friday, September 03, 2004 http://www.platts.com ------------ Germany's Obrigheim nuke to shut in 438 days: ministry London (Platts)--3Sep2004 Germany's Obrigheim nuclear power plant is to be decommissioned in 438 days, the country's environment ministry said in its latest update. Obrigheim, Germany's oldest and smallest nuclear power plant with a generation capacity of 357MW, is allowed to generate about 1.78TWh under the German decommissioning law of 2000. Obrigheim is owned and operated by Energie Baden- Wurttemberg. The next plant to be shut after Obrigheim is RWE's Biblis-A, which is allowed to generate 32.16TWh of power. This means the theoretical shut-down of the 1,225MW reactor is in 906 days. The third plant to be shut if ENBW's Neckarwestheim-1, which has a generation allowance of 29.73TWh of electricity. This means the 840MW reactor is to be shut in about 1,550 days, said the ministry. Eon's Stade plant, which generated a maximum of 672MW, was switched off on Nov 14, 2003 with a left- over generation amount of 5.33TWh. A decision has yet to be made about the transfer of that amount to other plants. ------------ South Korea discloses it enriched uranium Bonn (Platts)--3Sep2004 Revelation that South Korea enriched uranium outside of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in 2000 will set back efforts by the IAEA and its member states to rein in nuclear programs in both Iran and North Korea, Western government sources said. The Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST) of the Republic of Korea (ROK) made known Sep 2 that it informed the IAEA Aug 17 in its initial declaration under the Additional Protocol for safeguards under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Infcirc-540, that a group of ROK scientists had enriched about 0.2 grams of uranium feedstock in an atomic vapor laser isotopic separation (Avlis) facility in an undisclosed location in the ROK in January or February 2000. According to unconfirmed information, the enrichment level may have been as high as about 80% U-235, close to weapons grade (over 90% U-235) and far above the level of 3% U-235 to 5% U-235 required for South Korea's power reactors. Beginning Aug 29, a group of IAEA safeguards officials have been in South Korea to follow up the report. MOST said that the equipment used to enrich the uranium had been dismantled and the research program terminated. According to MOST, the Avlis laboratory had been set up to enrich isotopes of gallium, thallium, and samarium, as well as uranium. Initial official explanations for the research program which enriched the uranium were however not fully consistent. While MOST said that the ROK "never had a program for enrichment" of uranium, it also said that the laboratory where the enrichment had taken place had been set up to further "domestic production of nuclear fuel." IAEA and South Korean officials immediately tried to limit damage by asserting that the declaration was made as a result of the ROK's participation in the Additional Protocol, stating that the enrichment might have remained undeclared without the requirement of the initial declaration. But Western safeguards officials said that under Infcirc-236, which went into force back in 1975, Seoul was firmly obligated to have reported the enrichment of any uranium to the IAEA no later than the time it occurred and most likely before the experiment was conducted. They said Infcirc-236 required the ROK to file to the IAEA, and explain, any intended changes or movements in its nuclear materials inventory such as plans to subject uranium feedstock to processing in an Avlis installation. "This is clearly a technical violation by South Korea of its safeguards agreement, because there are no de minims standards for production of special nuclear material under Infcirc-236," one safeguards official said. "There is no room for fudging on this." That will cause problems for both the IAEA and its member states at an upcoming meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in two weeks. Beginning on Sep 16, the Board will address outstanding issues in Iran's nuclear activities, under investigation by the IAEA since early 2003. Iran has likewise been found by the IAEA to have committed technical infractions of its safeguards agreement by unreported enrichment of small quantities of uranium using laser technology, documented in an internal IAEA report to the Board which was completed on Sept. 1 and obtained by Platts. Western officials said that it is expected that should the Board cite the ROK for a technical violation of Infcirc-236 but, in the words of one Western official "pardon" Seoul, as it pardoned Romania for a similar late declaration, of a small quantity of separated plutonium 15 years ago, Iran will argue that a double standard is being applied in international surveillance of its nuclear program vis-a-vis programs elsewhere including South Korea. "The drafters are already going to work on this," one Western government official involved in preparing forthcoming Board of Governors resolutions told Platts. The revelation of undeclared South Korean enrichment "has messed up our plan of attack in Vienna," he said. For Iran, one former US official commented, "this news is a godsend." Likewise, the reported enrichment activity by the ROK will thwart efforts to reduce the threat from North Korea's clandestine nuclear program and, in particular, from an alleged secret gas centrifuge enrichment project which the US since 2002 has claimed exists. The enrichment by ROK four years ago violated a 1991 bilateral agreement between the two Koreas banning reprocessing and enrichment activities on the Korean peninsula. Both Iran and North Korea are expected to point out soon that, during the 1970s, South Korea's political leaders had threatened to develop nuclear weapons. The former US official said that US intelligence "has continued to be concerned about this prospect" until recently despite assertions by ROK leaders, reiterated today, that Seoul has no nuclear weapons program or ambitions. Separately, the hidden enrichment activity may challenge efforts by Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) to ease the safeguards burden on its power reactors in exchange for Korean adherence to the Additional Protocol. The IAEA has begun to take steps in this direction, but only on the basis of successful confidence building which appears to have been set back. The IAEA will not agree to allow the ROK to assume inspection duties previously performed by the IAEA if it loses confidence that all nuclear activities, and especially any fissile material research programs, are fully declared and explained. ------------ Monticello, Prairie Island to seek license extensions Washington (Platts)--1Sep2004 Monticello and Prairie Island will seek 20-year license extensions, owner Xcel Energy announced today. Monticello's license expires in 2010; the licenses for Prairie Island-1 and -2 are up in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Jim Alders, Xcel's manager of regulatory projects, told Platts today the company plans to file the Monticello application in first quarter 2005. He said the company did not yet have a planned date for the Prairie Island filing. ------------